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Neo-Brandeisianism and the New Deal: Adolf A. Berle, 
Jr., William O. Douglas, and the Problem of Corporate 
Finance in the 1930s 
Jessica Wang† 
This essay revisits Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property by focusing on the triangle of Berle, Louis D. 
Brandeis, and William O. Douglas in order to examine some of the un-
derlying assumptions about law, economics, and the nature of modern 
society behind securities regulation and corporate finance in the 1930s.  I 
explore Douglas and Berle’s academic and political relationship, the 
conceptual underpinnings of Brandeis, Berle, and Douglas’s critiques of 
modern finance, and the ways in which the two younger men—Berle and 
Douglas—ultimately departed from their role model, Brandeis.  Douglas 
and Berle both styled themselves as intellectual and political heirs of 
Brandeis, “the people’s lawyer.”  From the late 1920s and into the New 
Deal years, they traveled in the same academic and political circles as 
legal scholars who sought to graft social scientific inquiry to the analysis 
of corporate finance.  In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 
Berle provided the defining statement for a younger generation’s inter-
pretation of Brandeis’s critique of how financial elites took advantage of 
“other people’s money.”1  Backed by Gardiner Means’s rigorous empiri-
cal research, Berle provided a hard-hitting analysis of the ever-widening 
separation between ownership and control and its disturbing implications 
for the nature of property and ownership in modern society.  Douglas, a 
less original thinker, drew heavily upon both Brandeis and Berle in his 
efforts to expose the ugly realities of corporation reorganization as a reg-
ulator at the Securities and Exchange Commission in the 1930s. 
                                                        
† Department of History, University of British Columbia.  I wish to thank Chuck O’Kelley for invit-
ing me to participate in this volume, and I am grateful to Ken Lipartito and Harwell Wells for clari-
fying my understanding of Brandeis.  In addition, I thank all of the participants at the symposium, In 
Berle’s Footsteps, for their energetic discussions and lively exchange of ideas. 
 1. Louis D. Brandeis took the phrase “other people’s money” from Adam Smith’s The Wealth 
of Nations (1776) and used it as the central theme for his own classic work, Other People’s Money 
and How the Bankers Use It (1914). 
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Historian Ellis W. Hawley long ago identified a neo-Brandeisian 
strain within the New Deal and examined the ways in which Brandeis’s 
outlook on industrial society and the threat of concentrated economic 
power permeated the consciousness of central figures in the history of 
1930s securities regulation.2  Berle, Douglas, and other New Deal fol-
lowers of Brandeis, however, differed sharply from their role model 
when it came to the moral and spiritual dimensions of modern economic 
relationships.  Where Brandeis had underscored the need to uphold 
Americans’ capacity for self-rule and active participation in economic 
decision making, Berle and Douglas focused on economic efficiency and 
protection of ordinary investors, whom they assumed would remain es-
sentially passive actors in market relations.  Brandeis wanted to lift “the 
curse of bigness” and restore power and control to local communities by 
breaking apart large, far-flung economic combinations.  By contrast, al-
though Berle and Douglas distrusted large organizations and their power, 
in the end they sought not to destroy bigness, but to tame it through gov-
ernment regulation and oversight. 
The early twentieth century efforts of Brandeis, Berle, and Douglas 
to grapple with corporate finance still have much to tell us today about 
the instability of the market, the dizzying complexity of modern financial 
instruments, the sheer imbalance of power between ordinary investors 
and financial elites, and the struggle for regulation.  But history seeks to 
illuminate not only the familiar, but also the strangeness of the past.  The 
final section of this essay addresses the latter by exploring Berle’s invo-
cation of revolution and radical skepticism about prevailing conceptions 
of private property.  That Berle could mount so daring an intellectual 
challenge to the foundational principles of industrial capitalism yet re-
main politically mainstream reminds us of the gulf that separates his past 
from our present, even as the separation of ownership from control re-
mains as vexing as ever. 
I.  DOUGLAS AND BERLE: AN ACADEMIC AND POLITICAL FRIENDSHIP 
In the early 1930s, Douglas and Berle developed a cordial academic 
relationship out of their mutual interest in bankruptcy and corporate 
                                                        
 2. See ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN 
ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE §§ 15–16 (1966).  Hawley left Adolf A. Berle off of a long list that in-
cluded James M. Landis, Benjamin Cohen, and Thomas G. “Tommy the Cork” Corcoran—the au-
thors of the New Deal’s key financial regulatory measures, the Securities Act of 1933, and the Se-
curities and Exchange Act of 1934—as well as Felix Frankfurter and William O. Douglas.  The 
omission reflected Hawley’s emphasis on a divide between Frankfurter’s group of “Happy Hot 
Dogs” (Landis, Cohen, and Corcoran) and the Brain Trust of Berle, Rexford Guy Tugwell, and 
Raymond Moley.  His study generally overstated the commitment to anti-trust of Brandeis’s self-
proclaimed disciples, however. 
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finance.  Douglas and Berle first crossed paths at the Columbia Universi-
ty School of Law, a hotbed of the legal realist movement until infighting 
led to an exodus of realists in 1928.  Berle, who launched a private prac-
tice in New York City in 1924, angled for a position at Columbia for 
several years before joining the faculty on a temporary basis in 1927.  
The appointment became permanent the following year.  Douglas, a 
graduate of Columbia’s law school, began lecturing there part time in 
1925.  For two years, he alternated between teaching and unhappy stints 
as a corporate lawyer on Wall Street before becoming a regular faculty 
member at Columbia in 1927. 
Berle and Douglas’s scholarly interests made them a natural fit.  
Berle played a major role in founding corporation finance as a scholarly 
field in the mid 1920s.  Although he did not openly identify himself as a 
legal realist, his dedication to empirical research and his institutional-
ism—rooted in the theoretical work of the iconoclastic economist and 
intellectual Thorstein Veblen—accorded well with the content and intel-
lectual style of legal realism.  Indeed, The Modern Corporation and Pri-
vate Property, with its emphasis on the disjuncture between traditional 
legal theories of property and socioeconomic realities, could be consi-
dered a classic legal realist text. 3 
 Douglas, following the path of his mentor Underhill Moore, 
sought to apply social scientific methods to the study of business pheno-
mena as part of the empiricist wing of legal realism.  After he left for 
Yale Law School in 1928, Douglas carved out his early reputation by 
undertaking social scientific studies that employed court records, ques-
tionnaires, and interviews in order to uncover the social realities of bank-
ruptcy and their divergence from legal theory.  Although federal bank-
ruptcy law was well-established by the end of the 1920s, few reliable 
statistics or other concrete data about the actual workings of bankruptcy 
and corporate reorganization existed.  A small group of pioneering re-
searchers, including Douglas, Leon Henderson of the Russell Sage 
Foundation (another future New Dealer), and a group at the Department 
of Commerce, worked to fill the gap. 
As scholars, Douglas and Berle combined legal knowledge and 
economic expertise with a depth and sophistication rarely seen before 
their generation.  During the late 1920s and early 1930s, they enjoyed a 
collegial relationship defined by the usual rhythms of academic life.  
They requested materials from each other, exchanged ideas, planned con-
ference sessions together, expressed their admiration for each other, and 
                                                        
 3. Some reviewers at the time underscored the legal realist dimensions of The Modern Corpo-
ration and Private Property.  See Richard S. Kirkendall, A. A. Berle, Jr. Student of the Corporation 
1917–1932, at 35 BUS. HIST. REV. 43, 46 (1961). 
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traded recriminations over their too busy, overcommitted academic lives.  
Although the ever-insecure and competitive Douglas resented Berle’s 
greater professional and political success and occasionally badmouthed 
him behind his back,4 the two remained on good terms.  After Franklin 
D. Roosevelt entered the White House, their correspondence turned to 
public policy, particularly the administration’s plans to regulate the se-
curities market, one of the cornerstones of the New Deal.  In letters to 
Berle and other colleagues, Douglas excoriated the Securities Act of 
1933—a sunshine law mandating registration and truthful disclosure 
statements for newly-issued securities with the Federal Trade Commis-
sion—as a weak-kneed and inadequate response to the enormous prob-
lems that plagued securities and corporate finance.  To Berle, Douglas 
labeled the Act “a rather laborious and untimely effort to turn back the 
clock and quite antithetical to many of the other significant current de-
velopments.”5  Berle, by then a Washington D.C. insider as part of the 
New York-centered “Brain Trust” that advised Roosevelt throughout his 
first presidential campaign and in the early years of the New Deal, re-
sponded apologetically, “I get generally blamed for the Securities Act, 
the fact being that I thought that, as no [here Berle originally wrote 
‘though’ and crossed it out] emergency required its immediate passage, it 
would not be a bad idea to do a good deal of long range thinking on the 
subject.”  Berle scornfully described Felix Frankfurter, who had contri-
buted to the drafting of the act (although its primary authors were his 
protégé, James M. Landis, as well as Thomas G. “Tommy the Cork” 
Corcoran and Benjamin V. Cohen), as knowing “next to nothing about 
the subject except on paper.”  Frankfurter, Berle claimed, thought “he 
had reached the final and everlasting answer” to the problems of the se-
curities market, whereas Berle saw the act as a beginning.  “The result of 
the Securities Act,” Berle observed, “will be that the United States gov-
ernment will go into the investing banking business before very long.”  
He added drily, “There might be worse results.”6 
                                                        
 4. See JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, THE NEW DEALERS: POWER POLITICS IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 
159 (1993). 
 5. Letter from William O. Douglas to Adolf A. Berle, Jr. (Dec. 29, 1933), (on file with Library 
of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William O. Douglas [hereinafter Douglas papers], Box 
2, Folder 5)  See also Letter from William O. Douglas to George E. Bates, (Nov. 1, 1933), in Doug-
las papers at Box 2, Folder 1.  To Bates, his collaborator on a joint course between the Yale Law 
School and the Harvard Business School, Douglas described himself as “fed up with the Securities 
Act.”  Id. 
 6. Letter from Adolf A. Berle, Jr. to William O. Douglas (Dec. 30, 1933), Douglas papers, 
supra note 5, at Box 2, Folder 5.  Berle’s long-held contempt for Felix Frankfurter dated back to his 
student days at Harvard Law School.  See JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND 
THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN ERA 14–15 (1987); WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN: 
THE EARLY YEARS: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 369 (1974). 
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Douglas responded to Berle’s opening with enthusiasm and re-
minded his friend of his willingness to serve if called.  He hoped that the 
New Deal would now “get at the really fundamental problem of the in-
crement of power and profit inherent in our present forms of organiza-
tion.”  By that, Douglas meant rearranging the securities market along 
the lines of the National Recovery Administration (NRA), with its efforts 
to boost prices and stymie deflation by enlisting industries into a com-
plex system of codes and price-fixing, with concessions to labor in the 
form of a guaranteed right to collective bargaining.  He told Berle, “Per-
haps it will not be long before we can see security regulation occupying 
as prominent a place in the present codes as prices and costs, competition 
and monopoly, consumption and production, etc.”  Douglas concluded 
with an invocation of the choice between drift and mastery that progres-
sive journalist and writer Walter Lippmann had once identified as the 
cardinal choice of the modern industrial age—a reference still familiar to 
anyone in progressive political circles in the 1930s.7  Douglas wrote, 
“The gradual drift, or better yet, the conscious direction of the United 
States into the investment banking business is one of the most significant 
contributions to the mastery of high finance which this generation has 
seen.  Any securities act could point with pride to such an accomplish-
ment.”8 
While Berle and other contemporaries descended upon Washington, 
Douglas waited for the call.  In the spring of 1933, he considered under-
taking research for Ferdinand Pecora, the special counsel to the Senate 
Committee on Banking and Currency, who was leading the Senate’s 
charge against malfeasance on Wall Street.  Instead, Douglas continued 
to churn out academic articles, hone his critique of the Securities Act of 
1933 and his case for stronger protections for investors, and bide his 
time.  His break came with the passage of the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934, which created the Securities and Exchange Commission 
                                                        
 7. See William E. Leuchtenburg, Introduction to WALTER LIPPMANN, DRIFT AND MASTERY: 
AN ATTEMPT TO DIAGNOSE THE CURRENT UNREST (University of Wisconsin Press ed., 1985). 
 8. Letter from William O. Douglas to Adolf A. Berle, Jr. (Jan. 3, 1934), Douglas papers, supra 
note 5, at Box 2, Folder 5.  Douglas also floated the idea to Herman Oliphant, another former Co-
lumbia colleague in the legal realist camp.  By 1934, Oliphant had moved to Washington to become 
general counsel at the Treasury Department.  Douglas wrote, “In any program for genuine protection 
of investors I believe that truth about securities is the secondary rather than the primary line of de-
fense. . . .  I think the statute we need lies somewhere between the [English] Companies Act and the 
present Securities Act.  I would superimpose on such type of control a further control of an adminis-
trative kind.  If the various codes are to be a permanent part of our organization, I think before long 
we will have to incorporate in them control over security issues.”  Letter from William O. Douglas 
to Herman Oliphant (March 2, 1934), Douglas papers, supra note 5, at Box 11, Folder 15; see also 
Letter from William O. Douglas to Herman Oliphant (March 9, 1934), Douglas papers, supra note 5, 
at Box 11, Folder 15. 
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(SEC) and the promise of new mechanisms to regulate the securities 
market.  Douglas, never one to conceal his ambitions, angled for a seat 
on the commission.  He did not come away with the prize that he sought.  
But James M. Landis, impressed by an article Douglas had written on 
railroad reorganizations, tapped him to head the SEC’s study of protec-
tive and reorganization committees.  The Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934 mandated the study, and the SEC’s architects anticipated that it 
would produce another major round of regulatory legislation.  Thus the 
Protective Committee Study carried far greater weight than its unprepos-
sessing title suggested.  Douglas himself viewed the position as a step-
ping stone to the SEC chairmanship and eagerly took the job in the 
summer of 1934.9  After Joseph Kennedy stepped down and Landis 
moved to the chairmanship, Douglas attained a seat on the commission in 
1935, and he ascended to the much-coveted chairmanship in 1937. 
Douglas’s move to the SEC, combined with the failure of the Na-
tional Recovery Administration, muted his criticisms about New Deal 
securities regulation.  The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which 
established the SEC as an agency with considerable discretionary power 
to develop economic knowledge and implement new regulations to deal 
with the problems of the securities market, possessed the regulatory 
prowess to satisfy Douglas in ways that the earlier act had not.  Mean-
while, as the bureaucratic unwieldiness and economic shortcomings of 
the NRA experiment became increasingly apparent, Douglas quietly 
abandoned his earlier calls for close management, control, and planning 
in the securities market.  Instead, he embraced Landis’s governing ideol-
ogy for the agency, which endorsed regulated capitalism over economic 
planning.  Throughout his six-year career at the SEC, Douglas argued for 
the need to establish an appropriate balance between, on the one hand, 
preserving and encouraging the dynamism of the free market as a realm 
of individual free choice, and on the other, aggressively targeting the un-
derhanded and illicit practices that left individual investors vulnerable to 
the manipulation and coercion that produced the grotesque inefficiencies 
and spectacular failures of the unregulated marketplace. 
As Douglas made his career in public service, his friendship with 
Berle moved to the political realm.  Berle had decided that work as a 
publicist and booster on behalf of the New Deal, rather than a specific 
position in the Roosevelt administration, better suited his ambitions.  He 
also enjoyed working behind the scenes, within Democratic Party circles 
in New York state and at the national level.  Historian Jordan A. Schwarz 
                                                        
 9. See Letter from William O. Douglas to George E. Bates (April 7, 1933), Douglas papers, 
supra note 5, at Box 2, Folder 1; BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 106–08 (2003). 
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once aptly described Berle as a “free-lancer for Roosevelt and La Guar-
dia” and a “braintruster without portfolio.”10  For Douglas, Berle’s self-
appointed role meant occasional tips and leads in connection with the 
Protective Committee Study’s investigations of bondholders’ commit-
tees, and Douglas warmly welcomed Berle’s advice.11  When it became 
clear that SEC chairman Landis would leave the commission and return 
to Harvard, Berle pushed Roosevelt to appoint Douglas to the vacancy.  
By this point, Douglas—an inveterate social climber—had already estab-
lished himself as a prominent fixture in Washington’s high society, and 
his carefully cultivated talents as a raconteur had earned him a seat at 
Roosevelt’s regular poker table at the White House.  Douglas hardly 
needed help gaining high-level political access anymore, and with much 
of the shine off the Brain Trust, Berle’s intervention probably meant lit-
tle.12  Whatever the nature of Berle’s role, Douglas attained his long-
desired position.  Meanwhile, Berle remained active within the corridors 
of power in both New York state and Washington D.C.  In 1938, he fi-
nally took an official government position and moved to Washington as 
Assistant Secretary of State.  Berle had attended the Paris Peace Confe-
rence as part of the American delegation back in 1919, and in his State 
Department career, he pushed American-sponsored economic develop-
ment programs as an alternative to violent forms of imperialism.  He did 
not forsake his New Deal roots.  As Jordan Schwarz has pointed out, 
Berle’s foreign policy vision amounted to New Deal-style state capital-
ism on a global scale.13 
By the late 1930s, Douglas had surpassed Berle in public promi-
nence, and his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1939 cemented his 
status within the American political elite.  As an intellectual, however, he 
was no match for the man behind The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, one of the most important works in American economic 
thought of the twentieth century.  Douglas owed Berle considerable intel-
lectual debts, and both men derived their critiques of the modern econo-
my from a giant of the previous generation, Louis D. Brandeis.  For his 
work with the SEC in the 1930s, Douglas needed both Brandeis and 
Berle. 
                                                        
 10. SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 102–03. 
 11. See Letter from Adolf A. Berle, Jr. to William O. Douglas (Feb. 22, 1935); Letter from 
William O. Douglas to Adolf A. Berle, Jr. (Feb. 28, 1935); Letter from Adolf A. Berle, Jr. to Wil-
liam O. Douglas (June 18, 1935); Letter from William O. Douglas to Adolf A. Berle, Jr. (July 1, 
1935); Douglas papers, supra note 5, at Box 2, Folder 5. 
 12. See Letters from Adolf A. Berle, Jr. to William O. Douglas (Jan. 26 1937 & Feb. 1 1937), 
Douglas papers, supra note 5, at Box 2, Folder 5; SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 108; MURPHY, supra 
note 9, at 118–20; and DOUGLAS, supra note 6, at 317. 
 13. SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 113. 
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II.  OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY IN THE AGE OF THE MODERN 
CORPORATION: FROM BRANDEIS TO BERLE 
Two key works—Louis D. Brandeis’s Other People’s Money 
(1914) and Berle and Gardiner Means’s The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property (1932)—undergirded Douglas’s and other New Deal-
ers’ understanding of the problems of the modern political economy and 
the need for government regulation.  As lawyers who sought to integrate 
social scientific analysis into law and public policy, both Douglas and 
Berle followed in Brandeis’s footsteps.  In 1908, Brandeis’s introduction 
of the “Brandeis brief” in Muller v. Oregon, which mobilized all manner 
of social scientific and medical data to defend a protective labor law for 
women, transformed legal practice.  Although most of the data Brandeis 
cited reflected opinion laden with gender biases of the time period, and 
not what one today would recognize as rigorous scientific investigation, 
the brief nonetheless established the legitimacy of a new form of legal 
argumentation that rested on fact-based social analysis and not simply 
appeals to legal theory or precedent.  Brandeis did not singlehandedly 
turn the social scientific gaze onto American legal practice—credit also 
belongs to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., as well as the sociological juri-
sprudence of Roscoe Pound.  The “Brandeis brief,” however, combined 
with Brandeis’s crusading zeal as the nation’s most visible progressive 
lawyer, symbolized more than any other development the new power of 
social inquiry grafted to reformist politics.  As Berle described him in 
1936, Brandeis represented “the strictly modern methods of fact-finding, 
education, and political action.”14 
Six years later, with the publication of Other People’s Money, 
Brandeis provided a critique of large organizations and their command of 
modern financial life that inspired at least two generations of progres-
sives.  Other People’s Money detailed the workings of a modern finan-
cial system in which bankers occupied new positions of privilege and 
power.15  They served on boards of directors and protective committees 
and played managerial roles in corporate reorganizations.  By exploiting 
the organizational instruments of modern corporate finance—voting 
trusts, interlocking directorates, joint ownership—bankers acquired con-
trol of large business enterprises and established themselves as a new 
“financial oligarchy.”16  From Brandeis’s standpoint, the bankers’ con-
centration of economic power in and of itself constituted a dangerous 
                                                        
 14. A. A. Berle, Jr., The Way of an American, 25 SURV. GRAPHIC 597 (1936). 
 15. On the impact of Other People’s Money and its status as an exemplar of empiricist, social 
scientific inquiry, see STEVE FRASER, EVERY MAN A SPECULATOR: A HISTORY OF WALL STREET IN 
AMERICAN LIFE 295–302 (2005). 
 16. BRANDEIS, supra note 1, at 4. 
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locus of power that threatened democratic values, but he also took pains 
to document how investment bankers failed to use their authority wisely 
or equitably.  By exercising their control over the supply of capital, 
bankers manipulated stock and bond prices and stifled economic compe-
tition.  In addition, they profiteered by charging exorbitant sums for un-
derwriting and other services.  Far from supplying capital as the engine 
of innovation, they frequently impeded the development of new technol-
ogies.17  To add insult to injury, the bankers did not even have to use 
their own money to amass enormous profits at the expense of investors.  
Instead, they enjoyed “the privilege of taking the golden eggs laid by 
somebody else’s goose.”18  Although investors enjoyed ownership rights 
in theory, their isolation, atomization, and lack of access to information 
rendered them helpless to exert any meaningful control over their eco-
nomic fates.  Into this power vacuum stepped the bankers.  Brandeis in-
dignantly observed, “They control the people through the people’s own 
money.”19 
Brandeis argued his case against modern corporate finance with a 
distinctive moral fervor that energized progressives and their New Deal 
descendants.  Brandeis cared less about the negative economic effects of 
investment banking than what he saw as its corrosion of American indi-
vidualism and self-rule.20  Although he once believed that some large 
corporate enterprises managed to conduct themselves virtuously, by the 
early twentieth century he opposed with ever-growing vigor what he 
called “the curse of bigness.”21  Unlike Theodore Roosevelt and the other 
exponents of the New Nationalism, who believed in the inevitability of 
big business and the possibility of its efficiency, Brandeis, by 1912, 
could declare forthrightly, “There are no good trusts.”22  Combinations, 
Brandeis believed, tended by their nature to stifle economic competition 
and, even worse, they endangered democratic self-rule.  As he declared 
in Other People’s Money, “far more serious even than the suppression of 
competition is the suppression of industrial liberty, indeed of manhood 
itself, which this overweening financial power entails.”23  With respect to 
the nation’s railroads, Brandeis wrote, “[I]n nearly every case the absorp-
tion into a great system of a theretofore independent railroad has in-
volved the loss of financial independence to some community, property, 
                                                        
 17. See id. chs. 1, 7. 
 18. Id. at 17–18. 
 19. Id. at 18. 
 20. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE (2009). 
 21. Id. at 94–97, 161. 
 22. Id. at 308. 
 23. BRANDEIS, supra note 1, at 48. 
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or men, who thereby become subjects or satellites of the Money Trust.”24  
On the whole, the financial system shunted power away from the vast sea 
of ordinary Americans and instead enriched a tiny minority.  Brandeis 
observed, “The depositors are largely wage earners, salaried people, or 
members of small tradesmen’s families.  Statically the money is used for 
them.  Dynamically it is used for the capitalist.  For rare, indeed, are the 
instances when savings banks moneys are loaned to advance productive-
ly one of the depositor class.”25  Over and over again, Brandeis described 
a system that deprived individuals and communities of power and control 
and that therefore failed to take advantage of Americans’ true potential.  
Brandeis concluded, “If industrial democracy—true cooperation—should 
be substituted for industrial absolutism, there would be no lack of indus-
trial leaders.”26  Modern high finance did not simply exact economic 
costs—it damaged citizens’ capacity for self-rule and left the collective 
energies of society untapped and dissipated.  Where large enterprises 
were unavoidable, Brandeis could imagine maintaining competition 
through aggressive regulatory action, although he feared big government 
almost as much as big business.  He preferred breaking up large combi-
nations and, to the extent possible, restoring an old economic order of 
small competing units and a culture of ownership that he believed best 
fostered liberty and democracy.27 
In an age in which doubts about the basic nature of industrial socie-
ty dominated public discourse, critiques such as Brandeis’s held wide-
spread appeal.  From roughly 1870 to 1940, the question of whether in-
dustrial capitalism could generate and distribute wealth without unac-
                                                        
 24. Id. at 174. 
 25. Id. at 218. 
 26. Id. at 208. 
 27. See generally THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS 
ADAMS, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN ch. 3 (Belknap Press 1984); 
UROFSKY, supra note 20.  Gerald Berk has challenged the conventional image of Brandeis and the 
“curse of bigness” with an analysis of Brandeis’s conception of scientific management and railroad 
cost accounting in the 1912 Eastern Rate case, in which he argues that Brandeis was far more will-
ing to countenance government intervention to regulate large business enterprises than McCraw and 
other scholars acknowledge.  See Gerald Berk, Whose Hubris?  Brandeis, Scientific Management, 
and the Railroads, CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE AMERICA: HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE 120–48 
(Kenneth Lipartito and David B. Sicilia ed., Oxford University Press 2004).  It is telling, however, 
that Berk’s two examples—gas and railroads—were business endeavors widely considered in the 
early twentieth century to be “natural monopolies,” which may explain why Brandeis did not envi-
sion breaking up combinations in these cases.  Berk’s interpretation refines the prevailing under-
standing of Brandeis’s conception of political economy, but does not, I think, completely overturn it. 
Berk’s analysis is nonetheless important as a reminder of the modernist dimensions of Brandeis’s 
economic thinking, which have made his intolerance of bigness so confounding to latter-day readers.  
No less a personage than Adolf A. Berle, Jr. could identify Brandeis with modern methods, but also 
accuse him of wanting “to turn the clock backward.”  ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, 
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY viii (1932). 
2010] Neo-Brandeisianism and the New Deal 1231 
ceptably high social costs constituted the central issue of the day.  Pro-
gressives looked to reinforce the social and collective bonds of society in 
order to contain what they perceived as the damaging consequences of 
rampant individualism.  Settlement houses and social surveys provided 
new ways of seeing society and exposing the light of public opinion on 
its harsh realities, while protective labor legislation, workers’ compensa-
tion, attacks on corporate abuses of power, and other political measures 
offered means of ameliorating the frequently appalling socioeconomic 
conditions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  Whether 
they concentrated on the plight of the urban poor or the broader outlines 
of law and political economy, progressives targeted industrial capitalism 
as a system in dire need of reform. 
The New Dealers inherited the progressives’ political and intellec-
tual legacies, and Berle embraced much of Brandeis’s critique of modern 
finance.  Berle imbibed Brandeisian progressivism practically from birth.  
Berle’s father encouraged his two sons to take Brandeis’s combination of 
intellect and activism as their model, and Berle’s parents expected all 
four of their children to excel.  An impressive list of guests dined at the 
Berle household during young Adolf’s childhood, including Brandeis 
and other Boston luminaries.  In 1916, after graduating from Harvard 
Law School at the age of twenty-one, Berle took a job at Brandeis’s law 
firm.  Although he enjoyed little if any direct contact with the grand mas-
ter, he nonetheless dreamed of becoming a reform-oriented, crusading 
lawyer like Brandeis.28  The dream shifted somewhat, as aspirations for 
wealth and public status turned Berle toward a career in corporate law.  
As a young lawyer making his way in the world in the 1920s, however, 
he continued to travel in progressive circles.  Like future New Dealers 
Harry Hopkins and Frances Perkins, Berle lived for a time at the Henry 
Street Settlement on New York’s Lower East side, an unusual choice of 
residence for someone striving to build a practice in corporate law.  But 
through his association with the settlement house and with progressive 
reformer Paul Kellogg and the social survey movement, he kept his feet 
on the ground within the gritty urban orientation of progressive reform 
while directing his intellectual energies toward the larger structural prob-
lems of the corporation, finance, and modern economic life.29 
The Brandeisian strain ran strong in Berle’s most famous work, The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property.  Berle and Means offered a 
stark and startling analysis of corporations, the organization of modern 
economic relationships, and the diminishing power of ownership.  But 
                                                        
 28. See SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 5–8, 16, 19. 
 29. See id. at 38–45. 
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while Brandeis frequently let moral suasion outpace fact-based analysis, 
Berle and Means developed the expansive empirical base to match their 
sweeping indictment of modern financial life and the corrosive effects of 
its ever more pervasive separation between ownership and control.  In a 
dry, rigorous, and sustained analysis far removed from Brandeis’s cru-
sading style, Berle and Means explained the complex structure of mod-
ern financial relationships and how the separation of ownership from 
control allowed managers to keep the benefits of ownership from share-
holders and instead “divert profits into their own pockets.”30  In addition 
to the basic fact of mass ownership of stock, which by itself diluted the 
power of ownership, a proliferation of legal and financial mechanisms 
exacerbated shareholders’ weakness.  Holding companies, non-voting 
stock, and voting trusts concentrated control in an ever-smaller elite.31  
Clauses in modern corporate charters easily bypassed shareholders’ tradi-
tional common law rights.32  New types of securities, such as stock pur-
chase warrants, blank stock, and securities convertible at the corpora-
tion’s option, eroded stockholders’ already limited expectations of con-
trol.33  The creation of different classes of stock diluted the theory that 
shareholders even represented a single, common interest, while directors’ 
power to distribute dividends further pitted shareholders against each 
other.34  Control over accounting practices placed “another powerful 
weapon” in the hands of directors.35  Meanwhile, court precedents wa-
vered over whether directors even had a fiduciary responsibility toward 
shareholders, or whether their loyalties properly lay solely with the cor-
poration itself.36  If the latter, then shareholders could not even hold onto 
the theoretical expectation that directors represented their interests.  
Berle called for the establishment of the principle that corporate man-
agement’s powers constituted powers held in trust for the benefit of all 
shareholders.  But he also admitted that “[i]t would require an expert and 
courageous court to apply this theory to most of the corporate problems 
reaching litigation.  For this reason, it cannot be reckoned on as a solu-
tion of the major difficulties in the problem.”37 
                                                        
 30. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 27, at 333. 
 31. See id. at 73–77. 
 32. See id. at 159. 
 33. See id. at 180–87. 
 34. See id. at 160, 193.  Changes in participation rights established by management also pitted 
stockholders against stockholders.  See id. at 215. 
 35. Id. at 202. 
 36. Id. at 328–29. 
 37. Id. at 276.  Here I should note that while Berle granted Means co-authorship and a third of 
the royalties, scholars have generally credited Means with developing the economic data that domi-
nated Book I of The Modern Corporation and Private Property, while attributing the book’s legal 
arguments and larger analytical structure to Berle.  See SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 58–59; Robert 
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In short, at virtually every turn circumstances tilted control away 
from shareholders and towards management, and the conditions of mod-
ern corporate finance rendered traditional protections and concepts obso-
lete.   The separation of ownership from control had completely under-
mined traditional assumptions about property and ownership.  Contract 
theory offered investors little more than “a fiction of law” in the face of 
shareholders’ inability to formulate or even understand their contractual 
relationship with the corporation.38  Litigation hardly offered sufficient 
remedies, since investors were so atomized that they could rarely mount 
a case.  “Scattered shareholders,” Berle noted, “do not easily organize for 
mutual protection.”39  Nor did the ideal of individualism offer more than 
empty rhetoric in the context of modern “economic empires” that consti-
tuted “a new form of absolutism, relegating ‘owners’ to the position of 
those who supply the means whereby the new princes may exercise their 
power.”  Honest acknowledgement of this existing state of affairs, Berle 
argued, “must bring with it a realization of the hollowness of the familiar 
statement that economic enterprise in America is a matter of individual 
initiative.”40 
The central problem lay in a profound disjuncture between legal 
and economic logic created by the rise of modern corporate finance.  In 
the final part of The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle 
underscored how the newly bifurcated quality of modern wealth—the 
passive wealth of shareholders as opposed to the active wealth that arose 
from management’s powers of control—had not only separated owner-
ship and management, but also economic and legal logic.41  The “tradi-
tional logic of property” implied that managers’ powers were powers in 
trust held for the benefit of stockholders.  Management was entitled to 
fair compensation for its labor, but no more.  Rather than rest his case on 
traditional legal theory, however, Berle raised the contrarian question—
why should profits not go to management?  “Are no profits,” he asked, 
“to go to those who exercise control and in whose hands the efficient 
                                                                                                                            
Hessen, The Modern Corporation and Private Property: A Reappraisal, 26 J.L. & ECON. 273, 274–
75 (1983).  I will, for the most part, drop the collective attribution at this point and refocus the narra-
tive on Berle alone.  It should be noted, however, that Berle, in his preface to the book, explicitly 
shared the credit with Means for the conclusions in Book IV. 
 38. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 27 at 188.  Berle continued: 
[S]hareholders do not bargain with their corporation and strike an agreement on the terms 
of corporation law and the charter before the stock is sold.  They almost certainly did not 
read the corporate charter, and probably would not have understood it if they had; and 
would be entirely helpless in the face of the provisions of a complicated corporation act. 
Id. 
 39. Id. at 218. 
 40. Id. at 125. 
 41. See id. at 344, 348. 
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operation of enterprise ultimately rests?”  Economic logic, Berle went on 
to explain, did not justify profit as solely an expectation of ownership.  
As he put it in a rhetorical question, “Where is the social advantage in 
setting aside for the security holder, profits in an amount greater than is 
sufficient to insure the continued supply of capital and taking of risk?”42  
To use the language of economics, Berle essentially posed the question 
of why investors should expect profits that went beyond their own mar-
ginal utility.  In the context of twentieth century economic relationships, 
the rationale for adhering to traditional concepts of ownership was not 
self-evident.  Just what should replace those concepts, however, re-
mained unclear. 
Some reviewers of The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
chided Berle and Means for their ambivalence about solutions and their 
failure to suggest reforms.43  Although the book’s conclusion opened the 
door to government intervention and the establishment of a “neutral 
technocracy” that could balance competing community interests, the trust 
theory that Berle laid out earlier in the book implied far more limited 
remedies.  As discussed above, Berle conceded that it would take a brave 
court to establish his trust theory as legal doctrine.  The theory did at 
least suggest, however, “that the common law has at its command tools 
adequate to meet the situation in sufficiently competent hands.”44  In 
theory, then, the existing legal process could handle the modern corpora-
tion. 
Douglas expressed considerable skepticism about Berle’s trust 
theory and griped to a former law school classmate about Berle’s 1931 
essay, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, an earlier version of the 
chapter with the same title in The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property.  “Some of the stuff this boy Berle has been getting off,” Doug-
las complained, “is not only bum law but also very very poor theory.”45  
More than personal envy was at work here.  A solution that relied upon 
courts rather than administrative power could hardly satisfy fervent ad-
vocates of federal regulation, who believed, as Berle himself admitted, 
that litigation offered too little too late in terms of the problems of the 
securities market.  In the closing pages of The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property, Berle reached for an alternative to a binary choice be-
tween traditional conceptions of property versus a wholesale embrace of 
                                                        
 42. Id. at 342–43. 
 43. See Kirkendall, supra note 3, at 54. 
 44. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 27, at 276. 
 45. Letter from William O. Douglas to Alfred McCormack (Oct. 1, 1931) in THE DOUGLAS 
LETTERS: SELECTIONS FROM THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 16 (Melvin I. 
Urofsky ed., Adler & Adler, Publishers 1987).  For Berle’s original article, see Adolf A. Berle, Jr., 
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931). 
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economic logic and corporate power.  He recognized that to the extent 
corporations had become state-like institutions, they became matters of 
public interest and could no longer be relegated to the realm of purely 
private transactions.46  On the campaign trail in 1932–1933, as part of 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “Brain Trust,” Berle supported Roosevelt’s 
early proposals for securities regulation and banking reform.  He drafted 
Roosevelt’s September 1932 San Francisco “Commonwealth Club” 
speech, which pointed to the existence of an “economic oligarchy” and 
called for government to develop new ways of protecting the public in-
terest that was now part and parcel of economic relationships once con-
sidered private.47  To that extent, Berle became a firm advocate of gov-
ernment regulation as the answer to the problem of the modern corpora-
tion.  Yet, as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. observed in his classic study of 
the New Deal, although Berle embraced the need for regulation, he con-
tinued to hope for “repentance and responsibility among business lead-
ers.”48  For all the boldness of the critique in The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property, Berle never entirely broke from convention when 
it came to solutions. 
One cannot imagine Brandeis hoping for redemption among the 
business elite.  More significantly, Berle departed from Brandeis on the 
question of bigness.  In broad outline, The Modern Corporation and Pri-
vate Property was a Brandeisian text whose analysis rested upon Bran-
deis’s attack on concentrated financial power and lent robust statistical 
representation to Brandeis’s fact-based but impressionistic depiction of 
money and power in modern America. Berle, however, viewed large or-
ganizations and concentrations of power as an inevitable characteristic of 
the modern political economy, and beyond a vague and passing nod to 
the potential collective power of consumers and labor, The Modern Cor-
poration and Private Property remained silent about the questions of 
citizens’ meaningful participation in self-governance that had animated 
Brandeis’s critique.49  In Berle’s work, Brandeisian inspiration served the 
                                                        
 46. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 27, at 354–57. 
 47. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER, 1919–1933, at 425 
(Houghton Mifflin 1957).  See also id. at 423, 425–26. 
 48. Id. at 415.  See also id. at 193; ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW 
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 49. Berle pointed to the “tens and hundreds of thousands of owners, of workers and of con-
sumers combined in single enterprises” that illustrated how “corporate enterprise” was remaking 
society as a whole and not simply the institution of the corporation.  Even here, however, he reached 
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worthy but more limited end of promising protections for investors and 
greater economic security for society at large, but sidestepped the prob-
lem of democratic rule in a modern, corporate age.  Where Brandeis 
sought to end “the curse of bigness,” Berle and other New Dealers tried 
to find ways to live with it. 
Like Berle, Douglas also drew heavily upon Brandeis for his own 
critique of how bankers and managers enriched themselves at the ex-
pense of security holders.  Like other analysts of modern finance in the 
1930s, he also looked to Berle and Means on the gulf between ownership 
and management and the wide-ranging powers of control held by man-
agement.  At the SEC, Douglas’s Protective Committee Study echoed 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property with an empirical analy-
sis that upheld Brandeis’s image of modern finance as a realm of mani-
pulation and malfeasance, and a set of solutions that offered investors 
protection, but not participation. 
III.  THE PROTECTIVE COMMITTEE STUDY AS NEO-BRANDEISIAN TEXT 
The massive, eight-volume Protective Committee Study explored 
the intricate workings of the protective and reorganization committees 
that were supposed to represent shareholders’ interests following declara-
tions of corporate bankruptcy.  In lavish detail, the study exposed the 
inequities of receivership and the ways in which bankers and corporate 
management exploited the reorganization process for their own ends.  
The analysis reflected both Brandeis’s and Berle’s depictions of modern 
finance, with an emphasis on the helplessness of ordinary investors that 
could have come straight out of Other People’s Money, and a stark por-
trayal of the gap between ownership and control that owed much to The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property.  Ultimately, the study pro-
duced two important pieces of legislation—the Chandler Act in 1938 and 
the Trust Indenture Act in 1939.  The Chandler Act, which established 
Chapter X bankruptcy, governed large corporate reorganizations for the 
next forty years.50 
Douglas grew up in rural south central Washington State with none 
of the Berle family’s social advantages, and he could not boast of child-
hood connections to “the people’s lawyer.”  Nonetheless, he too cast 
himself in a Brandeisian mold.  In his autobiography, Douglas claimed 
                                                                                                                            
disturbing conclusions from the perspective of democratic political theory, for he went on to indicate 
that “individual initiative” was becoming obsolete in a new era of large organizations.  BERLE & 
MEANS, supra note 27, at 349. 
 50. On the impact and significance of Chapter X bankruptcy, see DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S 
DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 123–25 (2001).  See also William W. 
Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737, 744–50 (2001). 
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that as a young man he dreamed of becoming a lawyer in Brandeis’s 
vein, and he named the senior justice as one of “six seminal forces in the 
law who shaped my life.”51  When he went to work at the SEC in 1934, 
he cultivated a personal relationship with the elderly Supreme Court Jus-
tice, and as the first volumes of the Protective Committee Study began to 
roll off the presses, he took a moment to thank his hero.  Douglas wrote 
unctuously to Brandeis, “It is needless for me to add that your own mo-
numental work on ‘Other Peoples [sic] Money’ has been a guiding star 
and inspiration to all of us who have collaborated on this present 
project.”52  A year later, when Douglas moved to the SEC chairmanship, 
he hung a portrait of Brandeis behind his desk, a gesture that sent a clear 
political message about where he stood on abuses of corporate power.53 
The Protective Committee Study itself took a distinctly Brandeisian 
tone as it described the plight of the ordinary investor, a forlorn figure 
whose isolation and powerlessness made him, or frequently her, helpless 
before the thieving machinations of financiers and corporations.  “The 
single and isolated security holder,” the Protective Committee Study ob-
served, “usually is helpless in protecting his own interests or pleading his 
own cause.”54  Lay investors were “scattered and uninformed” and there-
fore had little hope of combining their forces to challenge what the study 
called “the banker-management.”55  At every turn, trustees’ passivity and 
small investors’ lack of easy access to information left them vulnerable.  
“There have been instances,” the Protective Committee Study noted, “of 
failure to erect buildings in which purchasers of bonds supposed they had 
invested, of diversion of proceeds to service other issues sponsored by 
the same underwriter; and of other similar abuses.”56  A close examina-
tion of one case, the Celotex Company reorganization, exposed how the 
company’s president formed a reorganization committee that manipu-
lated stock prices in order to acquire the shares necessary to control the 
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reorganization, employed strong-arm tactics to encourage security hold-
ers to sell their shares to committee members, and engaged in aggressive 
profiteering from the reorganization itself, especially from the fees that 
the reorganizers’ front corporation, the Central Securities Corporation, 
took for underwriting the new common stock.  As the Protective Com-
mittee Study observed in its report, at no time did investors’ interests 
occupy the reorganization committee’s concerns.  The controlling group 
had no qualms about taking advantage of “unorganized, weak security 
holders”—to the contrary, it pursued “its selfish and undisclosed 
schemes with startling ruthlessness.”57  Brandeis had emphasized the 
weak, dependent status of small investors, for whom investment consti-
tuted “little better than a gamble” in the face of bankers’ inordinate pow-
er.58  In Celotex and countless other cases, Douglas and the staff of the 
Protective Committee Study also portrayed ordinary stockholders and 
bondholders as the helpless victims of large, well-organized forces that 
used others’ money to enhance their own wealth and power. 
In other key respects, however, the study sounded more like Berle 
than Brandeis.  In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, “con-
trol” more than “power” became the central concept for describing and 
understanding modern management’s usurpation of the traditional expec-
tations and functions of ownership.59  The Protective Committee Study 
similarly placed control at the center of the reorganization process.  Re-
organization constituted a “fight for control” in which “the emoluments 
of control” constituted “the stakes of reorganization.”60  Control of a re-
organization meant control of a company, and struggles for control oc-
curred in every area of the reorganization process—in underwriting, in 
committees’ efforts to acquire securities, in committees’ distribution of 
patronage.61  For both Berle and Douglas, control was not merely a con-
venient metaphor—it was a technical term that captured the underlying 
sociological function behind a diverse and complex set of actions. 
The Protective Committee Study’s recommendations, which em-
phasized improved representation for investors and measures to outlaw 
the conflicts of interest and other underhanded practices that pervaded 
corporate reorganizations, combined with government oversight, also 
shared more in common with Berle than Brandeis.  One might have im-
                                                        
 57. SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL, 
AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, PART I—STRATEGIES 
AND TECHNIQUES OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES 136 (1937) [hereinafter SEC 
STRATEGIES & TECHNIQUES REPORT].  See also id. at 99–136. 
 58. See BRANDEIS, supra note 1, at 8. 
 59. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 27, at Book I, chs. 5–6 & Book II, chs. 1–8. 
 60. SEC STRATEGIES & TECHNIQUES REPORT, supra note 57, at 4. 
 61. See id. at 137–55. 
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agined an alternative approach to reorganization that sought greater edu-
cation and direct involvement by security holders.  Douglas, however, 
had little sympathy for such approaches.  In the 1934 article on railroad 
reorganizations that had brought him to the SEC, he criticized as imprac-
tical proposals for giving the mass of security holders direct control in 
reorganizations and instead advocated “strengthening the position of 
committees, in assuring them full and complete powers, and in supplying 
control over them at the time of their constitution.”62  Douglas also made 
his position clear in a letter to his friend and fellow legal realist Jerome 
Frank, written before submitting the article for publication.  The reorgan-
ization process, he wrote, required “truly representative groups,” whereas 
proposals for “salvation” that relied on small investors were simply 
“naïve.”63 
Not surprisingly, a similar logic permeated the Protective Commit-
tee Study, which argued that circumstances required new, active regula-
tory legislation to prevent abuses and ensure vigorous representation of 
security holders.  To those critics who believed that knowledgeable in-
vestors already possessed the means to look after their own interests, and 
that the state should not feel obligated to create mechanisms that com-
pensated for investors’ ignorance, the study offered a sharp response: 
A point of view that regards an average investor as negligent be-
cause he is not acquainted with the rights conferred by appraisal sta-
tutes not only evidences a callous disregard of the interests of inves-
tors but also discounts realities.  The fact is that the average investor 
is not likely to be aware of these rights, or of the conditions with 
which he must comply to perfect them.  Nor can the responsibility 
of advising investors of these rights justifiably be placed upon bro-
kers or dealers.  It is essential to the efficacy of the appraisal sta-
tutes that minority stockholders be fully informed of their rights.  
This can be assured only by placing the responsibility upon the 
management.  Unless the management is required fully to advise the 
stockholders of their rights under these statutes, the protection they 
afford minorities will continue to be inadequate.64 
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Even if ordinary investors could manage to overcome their own ig-
norance, sheer inequalities of power prevented them from commanding 
their own fates.  As the Protective Committee Study noted with respect 
to defaulted municipal bonds, “The owners of the security themselves 
have no voice in the negotiations.  They do not undertake direct negotia-
tions with the city, either because of the expense involved, or lack of suf-
ficient knowledge, or realization that the city will not seriously discuss 
the situation with a small holder.”65  Elsewhere, in its volume on trustees 
under indenture, the Protective Committee Study noted that “the individ-
ual security holder is impotent when acting alone and can get together 
with his fellow security holders only at great labor and expense.”  As a 
result, lay investors had to rely on the trustee as “his alter ego in safe-
guarding his rights.” 66  Reform efforts accordingly needed to concentrate 
on ensuring proper, disinterested representation on the part of trustees. 
In essence, the study assumed that traditional nostrums about indi-
vidualism no longer applied.  Douglas and the Protective Committee 
Study instead viewed investors as a class or group that required better 
representation in order to level the economic playing field and to defend 
ordinary investors’ interests, as well as the insertion of the SEC’s exper-
tise into the reorganization process, as ultimately outlined under the 
Chandler Act and Chapter X bankruptcy.  This emphasis on the collec-
tive identity of the investing public in reorganization situations meant 
that although Douglas, like Berle, embraced much of Brandeis’s eco-
nomic critique, he did not imagine a return to the values embodied in a 
world of small producers and self-reliant individuals.  Rather, as the Pro-
tective Committee Study’s approach to regulating corporate reorganiza-
tions and other readjustments of debt indicates, he envisioned a future in 
which large organizations would continue to dominate American eco-
nomic life and in which the power of concentrated capital could be coun-
tered only by the state and by organized economic groups. 
As far as self-rule was concerned, the Protective Committee Study 
advocated “democratization of the processes of reorganization . . . with-
out running the risk of disorganization which would be entailed if these 
complicated and intricate financial and business problems were left to 
‘town meeting’ methods.”67  That was a far cry from Brandeis’s impas-
sioned call for industrial democracy.  By the 1930s, Berle, Douglas, and 
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other disciples of Brandeis had transformed their hero’s moral critique 
into a problem of technical policy management.68 
Such a transformation is not necessarily a bad thing, and it may be 
virtually inevitable any time a body of ideals has to be translated into a 
set of concrete policies.  Today, nearly a hundred years removed from 
Other People’s Money, it is difficult to know what Brandeis’s industrial 
democracy would look like, how it would generate wealth, and whether 
most Americans would actually find it desirable.  Meanwhile, the New 
Deal politics of Berle and Douglas remains directly relevant, even if its 
political viability is questionable in a considerably more conservative 
age.  The financial crisis of fall 2008 demonstrated anew the market’s 
capacity to generate economic chaos through lax regulation and the proli-
feration of new and virtually incomprehensible financial instruments.  
Whether the Obama administration will manage to pass comprehensive 
financial reforms and what final form its policy response will take, re-
mains to be seen.  But seventy-five years later, Berle and Douglas’s criti-
ques of corporate finance still seem all too revealing, and today’s poli-
cymakers might do well to reconsider the historical experience of securi-
ties regulation in the 1930s as they address the pitfalls of the modern 
corporation and private property in the twenty-first century. 
IV.  CODA: OWNERSHIP, REVOLUTION, AND THE PASTNESS OF THE 
PAST—THE RADICALISM OF ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. 
Yet, how usable a past does The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property really offer?  Elsewhere in this volume, Mark Mizruchi dis-
cusses readers’ tendency to pick and choose what they want from a text, 
and how this process has shaped the place of The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property in historical memory.  From the perspectives of 
historians, economists, and legal scholars, the book endures for its reve-
lations about the separation of ownership from control (or what scholars 
today prefer to call agency problems) and its contributions to the theory 
of the firm.   The seemingly intractable problem of corporate governance 
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shareholder democracy and argued that in the early 1940s the shareholder proposal rule, which 
opened proxy votes to greater shareholder intervention, allowed the SEC “to curb the ability of cor-
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that Kept Going: The Late New Deal SEC and Shareholder Democracy, 16 J. POL’Y HIST. 212, 229 
(2004). See also id. at 212–38.  In the absence of evidence to the contrary, one doubts whether 
shareholders were able to exploit the rule except on the rarest of occasions and, therefore, whether it 
had any significant effect in terms of promoting shareholder democracy.  Based on the secondary 
literature, however, Nicholas suggests that the increased threat of shareholder action had some visi-
ble impact on corporate behavior. 
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continues to provide a steady readership more than three-quarters of a 
century later.  A presentist mindset, however, obscures the most provoca-
tive element of Berle’s analysis, namely, its challenge to the very notion 
of private property.  Writing from a historical standpoint that viewed the 
past as punctuated by revolution, Berle boldly suggested that the separa-
tion between ownership and control transformed the nature of property 
so radically that private property, as conventionally understood, could no 
longer form the basis of the legal and economic systems. 
Berle, like most intellectuals of the early decades of the twentieth 
century, believed he lived in a time of fundamental change, defined by 
sharp disjunctures between past, present, and future.  As historian Doro-
thy Ross has observed, “There was no more characteristic refrain of the 
Progressive Era than that economic changes had created a world un-
known to the founders and that new industrial conditions required new 
practices.”69  Ross’s description applies just as well to the New Deal 
generation, which inherited much of the progressives’ worldview.  A 
belief that the present was not like the past, and that the future would not 
resemble the present, defined the sensibility of Americans who were 
acutely self-conscious about living in a modern age.  From the late nine-
teenth century onwards, the rise of new technologies, new institutional 
forms such as the corporation and the modern factory, unprecedented 
possibilities offered by mass production, and the proliferation of new 
economic and social relationships engendered by these developments 
both promised and threatened to overturn completely past assumptions 
about the economic foundations of American society.  For Berle and his 
contemporaries, history, with its dramatic record of revolutionary politi-
cal, scientific, and technological change, further underscored the sense of 
modernity as a condition of constant shifts in the social order. 
During the interwar years, no single event symbolized the disrup-
tive, revolutionary tendencies of the modern age more powerfully than 
the Russian revolution.  Back in 1919, Berle ended up in military intelli-
gence and a member of the American delegation at Versailles as an ex-
pert on Russia, despite the fact that he had neither been to Russia nor 
ever studied the Russian language.  From this vantage point, he observed 
the aftermath of the Russian revolution from Paris and aligned with those 
on the losing side of the U.S. diplomatic corps who believed that the 
Wilsonian principle of national self-determination required recognizing 
the Bolshevik government.70  It does not seem too far-fetched to tie 
Berle’s invocation of revolution in The Modern Corporation and Private 
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 70. See SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 23–30. 
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Property to this life experience and its place within his broader historical 
understanding of the economic transformation symbolized by the modern 
corporation. 
As Berle declared in the preface to The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property, as of 1928, “the financial machinery was developing so 
rapidly as to indicate that we were in the throes of a revolution in our 
institution of private property.”71  In case any readers doubted the se-
riousness implied by his use of the term “revolution,” Berle soon added 
that the corporate revolution matched the industrial revolution in signi-
ficance, and he described the transformation wrought by the separation 
of ownership from control as the outright annihilation of an old econom-
ic order centered on private property.  “This dissolution of the atom of 
property,” Berle observed, “destroys the very foundation on which the 
economic order of the past three centuries has rested.”  Just as the rise of 
private property marked the end of feudalism, so did the separation of 
ownership from control imply the end of private property as understood 
for three centuries.72 
References to revolution and its consequences recurred throughout 
the rest of the book.  In a discussion of data suggesting a growing trend 
towards stock ownership among persons of modest means, Berle telling-
ly asked, “Does it represent a permanent change in the ownership of in-
dustrial wealth comparable to the shift in land ownership which was an 
outgrowth of the French Revolution?”  In a very different passage about 
the prospects for shareholders to assert control over an entrenched man-
agement, Berle commented strikingly that in the rare instances where 
shareholders managed such a feat, the results were tantamount to a revo-
lution and not an assertion of democratic control.  As he put it, “Occa-
sionally [the stockholder] may have the opportunity to support an effort 
to sieze [sic] control, a position not unlike that of a populace supporting a 
revolution.”  Much later in the book, Berle famously suggested that the 
corporate system operated through “communist modalities.”  He ob-
served, “It is an odd paradox that a corporate board of directors and a 
communist committee of commissars should so nearly meet in a common 
contention. . . .  [I]t still remains true that the corporation director who 
would subordinate the interests of the individual stockholder to those of 
the group more nearly resembles the communist in mode of thought than 
he does the protagonist in private property.”  Perhaps Berle was indulg-
ing in a bit of Veblenesque provocation, but nonetheless the tart com-
                                                        
 71. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 27, at v. 
 72. See id. at vii, 8. 
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ment conveyed a sense of the corporation and communism as parallel 
modern projects of social transformation.73 
If Marx and Engels offered a theory about the alienation of workers 
from the means of production, Berle and Means highlighted the central 
irony of capitalists’ own alienation from ownership and property, as con-
trol over the means of production passed to a new set of managers.  In-
deed, Berle identified a specific shift in values that accompanied the 
transition from active to passive ownership.  Whereas the owner had 
once felt that physical property “represented an extension of his own per-
sonality,” Berle observed, “with the corporate revolution, this quality has 
been lost to the property owner much as it has been lost to the worker 
through the industrial revolution.”74  Berle’s perception of modernity as a 
sharp break from previous experience allowed him to imagine a future 
far removed from past conventions.  Indeed, he believed the economic 
realities of the early 1930s already demonstrated the emptiness of com-
forting nostrums about individualism and “the hollowness of the familiar 
statement that economic enterprise in America is a matter of individual 
initiative.”75  In a context of radically changing times, one could even 
envision a future in which American jurisprudence might rest on prin-
ciples other than private property.76  Such heretical thoughts made The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property far more than an exercise in 
dry and dutiful scholarship.  These were radical ideas that suggested the 
obsolescence of existing norms and the possibility that society in the fu-
ture would rest upon fundamentally different assumptions from those of 
the present.77 
Admittedly, Berle himself was no political radical.78  As discussed 
earlier, when it came to remedies, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property waffled over potential solutions, and the trust theory of Book II 
tempered the more expansive possibilities for governmental action hinted 
                                                        
 73. See id. at 62, 89, 278.  At the October 2009 symposium in honor of the opening of Seattle 
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at in Book IV.  Nor did Berle have much use for the Soviet experiment, 
as his dig at corporations as the realm of commissars implies.  Although 
he forcefully advocated government regulation of the securities market 
under the New Deal, throughout the Depression years, he also never en-
tirely abandoned the faith in the potential of self-regulation that had ani-
mated his thinking in the 1920s.  His acceptance of a seat on the New 
York Stock Exchange’s advisory board in 1934 provides one indication 
of Berle’s continued belief that institutions might learn to reform them-
selves, albeit with the added incentives provided by government regula-
tion.79  Radical theorizing about the end of private property appealed to 
the intellect, but Berle also lived in the real world of American politics, 
where he preferred pragmatism over revolution. 
A recognition of Berle’s more moderate persona, however, does not 
negate the radical dimensions of The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property.  That Berle could imagine a historical process driven by sud-
den shifts and periods of abrupt change reminds us that as much as his 
work still speaks to us today, his present was not our present, and the 
way in which observers in the 1930s conceived of possibilities differs 
sharply from our time.  For the most part, Americans no longer imagine 
that the present is profoundly different from their lived past, or that the 
future is likely to offer significant departures within their lifetimes.  The 
idea of revolution no longer possesses the same connotations that it held 
for Berle, for the revolutions of recent decades have not envisioned creat-
ing new and experimental societies, but reproducing older social orders.  
In the United States, after World War II, cold war intellectuals erected a 
bulwark against radical critique by pronouncing “the end of ideology” 
and insisting that interest group liberalism could take care of any remain-
ing problems in the American socioeconomic system.  The “rights revo-
lution” of the 1960s suggested more expansive possibilities, but it con-
centrated on extending an existing conception of rights to all individuals, 
regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender, and not the creation of a dramati-
cally new conception of rights.  Elsewhere in the world, Iran’s Islamic 
Revolution of 1979 sought to re-create an imagined past of tradition and 
piety, while the velvet revolutions of Eastern Europe in 1989 rested on 
overturning communist society by claiming liberal democracy and its 
economic partner, capitalism.  Of course, these revolutions wrought ex-
tensive changes within their own societies, but at an ideological level 
they were a far cry from the third world revolutions of the early post-
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World War II decades, most of which started with high hopes for the cre-
ation of new, radically different, and more just social orders, but ended in 
autocracy and repression.  By the end of the 1990s, intellectual historian 
and cultural critic Russell Jacoby lamented a profound change in the 
American consciousness, in which “a belief that the future could funda-
mentally surpass the present” was now “stone dead.”  He continued, “A 
new consensus has emerged: There are no alternatives.  This is the wis-
dom of our times, an age of political exhaustion and retreat.”80 
In this context, few readers over the past half century have ac-
knowledged, much less seriously engaged, Berle’s challenge to private 
property.81  His provocative analysis may have constituted the most pro-
found and daring part of the book, yet it has the least resonance today 
because Berle’s aching consciousness about revolutions as a living reali-
ty no longer possesses much cultural valence.  Berle and other scholars 
of his generation believed in questioning all conventional wisdoms be-
cause they lived in an era when one could easily imagine that the founda-
tional principles of the present might soon rest in the dustbin of history, 
which meant both dire instability and open possibility.  By contrast, in 
the present, the rhetoric of private property and its sanctity, the free mar-
ket as basis of freedom, and the desirability of an “ownership society” 
persists with nary a change in over a century, practically as if the likes of 
Brandeis, Berle, Douglas, and other twentieth century critics of Ameri-
can capitalism never existed.  Berle wrote for people who believed in 
changing times and not for us.  The gap between past and present yawns 
as widely as the separation of ownership from control. 
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